Russia showed to us that it was capable of more than just talk during the invasion of the Saakatchvili-led Georgia in 2008. In the biggest military conflict of the Caucasus since the 1994 Chechen war, Russia regained some of its prestige that it had lost during the disastrous wars on its soil in Chechnya. The former Soviet army had, at that point in 1994, disintegrated into a weak, corrupt army that couldn’t afford, in some cases, to pay the electricity bills of their own bases. All the military knowledge that the Soviet army had drilled into much of the new Russian Army was lost. Its military hardware was a gold mine for the corrupt officials, eager to fill their pockets with green American dollars during an appalling economic crisis. The Russian army was a bunch of demoralised, ramshackle mercenaries. Even if, in 2008, substantial improvements were made to the Russian army, who fought against American-trained and equipped Georgian soldiers, there were still many mistakes. Most notably, the loss of three of their aircraft to their own anti-air batteries, due to a lack of communication. On the 27th of February 2014, however, Russia demonstrated to the whole world how to take control of a region of two million people without firing a shot.
Sure enough, many in Crimea are Russian, and if not, Russian-speaking, but this may have been a one-of-a-kind invasion. Although Russia denied these troops were those of the Russian state at first, the Ukrainian authorities in the region declared having been forced to co-operate with the ‘Crimean state’, largely under the control of the Kremlin, as well as identifying the troops as Russian themselves. This military operation in Crimea may not have entirely dealt with the assertions that the Russian military is still corrupt, or that equipment is still largely Soviet, but it has given Russia a new diplomatic trait: that of unpredictability, boldness, and initiative. Many in the military world will agree that these are essential keys to winning the battle – diplomatic or not. Russia can finally show that, unlike the West, they are not simply saying something without having acted on it.
The 1994 treaty guaranteeing Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for the Soviet nuclear arsenal stockpiled in its lands (which had made it, by the way, the third largest nuclear power in terms of number of nuclear warheads in the world) was the West’s commitment to Ukraine. Unlike Russia, the signatories (most notably the US and UK) didn’t act. This lack of commitment gave room for Russia to operate. Just as with the Syrian question, Putin was able to put his diplomacy to use. The fact that the West had been involved in many government-changing operations (Libya, Iraq to name a few) made his ‘annexation’ of Crimea slightly more justified. Moreover, the West’s loss of credibility in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty made him more confident. The fact that no one in the West enters a conflict to honour treaties does present some advantages (Clemenceau, the French prime minister during the 1st World War said: “treaties only serve in creating new wars”), but this is against the point of treaties. Treaties are supposed to increase the influence of a power, for they act as deterrents, backed only by credibility. Russia now has more credibility than the West has, by default. In not actively helping Ukraine militarily, if only to deter the Russian ‘big brother’ from further annexation, we render our position in the world more feeble.
As most Western countries reduce the size of their militaries to help in the recovery of their economy, Russia increases it. As the West decides not to honour treaties, but Russia acts, its position is infinitely more credible. Russia has extremely close ties with what is likely to be the world’s greatest economic power, China. Russia’s economy is expanding (albeit more slowly this year). Diplomatically, Russia has been the dominant power, in Syria for example. This is the beginning of a new Russian pre-eminence in the world of politics. Look for countries to turn to Russia, rather than our ageing Europe or slowly declining United States, and for Russia to take the lead role in diplomatic affairs in the near future. It is therefore fair to assume that the Russian bear is back. Only in a new, evolved form.